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ABSTRACT 
Code of Corporate governance around the globe encourage the 
appearance of women in corporate board. The objective of this 
research is to observe the association between board gender 
diversity and its effects on bank performance which is based on 
evidence of Pakistan. The sample of this research comprises of 10 
listed banks of Pakistan. Secondary data has been collected of 12 
years from 2005 to 2016. Bank financial performance is measured 
through ROA and ROE. Analysis is done through descriptive 
statistics and linear regression are applied on the data through 
different tests such as Heteroscedasticity, Stationary of the data, 
Multicollinearity is tested through Dickey fuller and Augmented 
Dickey fuller approaches. The study summarizes that there is an 
insignificant association between board gender diversity and banks 
performance in Pakistan, it concludes that this study does not 
support the developed hypothesis that woman on board has 
insignificant effect on bank financial performance. 
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 The finding of this study recommends to use a large sample of banks with difference 
methodologies such as surveys, case studies and qualitative research to find out the 
causes of the question that why the women on board decreasing the financial 
performance. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Gender Diversity, Women on Board Number, 
Bank Financial Performance 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background of study  
 Corporate governance is a term which defined by various researchers in 
different ways. The firms who are operating according to the principles of corporate 
governance are more powerful in terms of profitability for their shareholders. Board 
of directors is one of the essential mechanisms of corporate governance. Board of 
director plays a vital role in accomplishing the objectives of the growth of company 
as well as caring the interests of company shareholders.  
 Right selection of the board of directors is essential part as they involved in 
strategic decision making as well as policy formulation of the company in this 
competitive age (VISHWAKARMA, 2017). The Board of directors (BOD) perform 
various task for instance: responsible for supervising and controlling managers, 
appoint and decide remuneration of senior management (NAHAR ABDULLAH, 
2004). 
 Further research found higher ratio of female in board increases the 
productivity and profitability of organization, thus positive performance effects of 
board gender diversity (VON BERGEN et al., 2005). The induction of women director 
is essential in some countries such as Norway and Spain has made it mandatory to 
have at least 40% women director for all listed companies, similarly Malaysia has 
imposed to have at least 30% women director on board (MOHAMED et al., 2015).  
 This is evident that women are different from men in terms of education 
background, experience and expertise, personality which mainly considers all these 
traits in decision making of firm (LIAO et al., 2015). Additionally women also consider 
as risk takers, compassionate, more dedicated and hard-working then men 
counterpart (ADAMS; FUNK, 2012).  
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  Lee et al. (2014) also explained that women is the source of well interactive 
with human resource and assist companies in retaining and developing relationship 
with investors, stakeholders and customers which leads to progress in the 
companies. We have hardly seen women director as independent, non-executive 
director and executive director. There are many women director in board who 
belongs to the controlling family and several businessmen grasp their family 
directorship just to get hold of their family business to carry further till next 
generation. 
1.2. Objectives 
 The purpose of the paper is to observe the effects of women director on bank 
performance level in Pakistan. This study adds various contributions to the present 
literature as there is lack of practical facts of the association between board gender 
diversity and bank performance in Pakistan, thus we deliver different approach on 
the participation of women director in the Pakistan banking sector through 
considering the presence of women director on board brings more benefits to bank. 
 This research increases a large variety of data of the 10 listed banks of 
Karachi Stock exchange from 2005 to 2016. Worldwide researchers have strived to 
build the association between the ratios of women on board and firms’ performance. 
The organization financial efficiency is determined by different constraints such as 
return on assets ROA, return on equity ROE.  
 This paper supports the exiting literature in two diverse ways: first we provide 
different approach on the participation of women director in the Pakistan banking 
sector by empower the accurate placing of women director on the corporate board. 
1.3. Problem Statement 
 In corporate sector of Pakistan, the subject of board gender diversity has 
become broadly discussed in present time. Rising number of women on boardroom 
has raised several queries about firm’s non-financial and financial efficiency. In light 
of above, many scholars are in process of studying about the effect of board gender 
diversity on banks profitability in several countries. 
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 1.4. Hypothesis development 
 One of the reason for low participation rate of women on board particularly in 
Pakistan’s corporate environment is due to gender discrimination where women 
consider as weaker leader than men counterpart (DOLDOR et al., 2012), the other 
reason is women are less likely to pursue their career because of their high family 
and cultural obligation and boundaries. Consequently firms perceived that, to have 
women director will affect their performance negatively (GOLDIN; KATZ, 2008).  
 However, in banking sector, the most preference is given to women on job 
due to many inherited benefits. It has also noticed that over the past few years the 
more women are on the senior management positions in banking industry. At this 
point, we generate our first hypothesis: 
• H1: Higher the number of women on boards the better is the performance of 
banking sector. 
• H2: The presence of woman on board, the better the efficiency of bank 
performance. 
• H3: Gender diversity improves the banking performance as measured through 
financial performance indicators that are ROA and ROE. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 This study investigates two element of board composition – first is 
independent director and other is women director that is limited to gender diversity. 
We initiate with theorizing of how women director may affect banking efficiency and 
performance and then we examine the influence of independent director of banking 
performance. 
2.1. Women director and bank performance 
 We discuss three major theories that provides the huge gender diversity that 
may improve board performance and contribute better in bank performance: agency 
theory, theory of resource dependency and third is gender role theory (TERJESEN 
et al., 2009a).  
 An agency theory explained that women brings balanced view on complicated 
problems which could maintain accurate information in problem solving and strategic 
decision making process (FRANCOEUR et al., 2008).  
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  In addition, with greater number of women particularly more than one woman 
or more than that on board improves and persuade on board’s decision making 
process (FONDAS; SASSALOS, 2000). There is evidence that shows greater 
number women in board have huge level of development program, evaluation 
(NIELSEN; HUSE, 2010) and monitor the management reporting that increase 
earnings value of organization (SRINIDHI et al., 2011).  
 The second theory is resource dependency as women directors bring quality 
resources, commitments and unique relations in board. The evidence shows that 
women have diversified network through which she understand and capture certain 
markets and customers as compare to male counterparts (IBARRA, 1993).  
 This theory also suggested that the greater number of board diversity is better 
the strategic decision and monitoring role of board and greater amount of women in 
banks boards enhance the diversity of knowledge, perspective, opinion, problem 
solving  which improves the formulation of polices and strategy and decision making 
process as well as controlling and monitoring function of board (WESTPHAL; 
MILTON, 2000).  
 Furthermore the induction of women independent director on boardroom 
brings better performance of bank in terms of monitoring and controlling function as 
the BOD could be able to oppose the authority of the higher management in the 
decision and control them from mishandling the power (HILLMAN et al., 2002).  
 The gender role theory described the individual gender that uses approach 
which is associated with their gender that expected to be apparent improved by 
others and this theory also explained that how men and women are different in terms 
of behaviors tactics with respect influences qualities and communication. For 
instance women are anticipated to more feminine part such as courtesy, 
understanding and flexible which expresses to better management of uncertain 
circumstances. Conversely men are likely to have more aggressive and assertive 
role (EAGLY, 1987; EAGLY et al., 1995).  
 In this study we expect the finding of our research will gives a significant 
signal to the policy makers to enhance the women selection rates in the corporate 
board in order to strengthen bank performance. 
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 2.2. Gender Diversity and bank performance 
 Existing research furnish mixed proof in terms of the connection between 
board gender diversity and banks performance. Agency theory describe that the 
affirmative impact of gender diversity on the organization efficiency and according to 
that theory, gender diversity is the essential corporate governance practice of 
organizations (GALLEGO-ÁLVAREZ et al., 2010) and diversified gender board 
perform a better controlling and monitoring tool of organization which resulting 
decrease the agency cost with agency issues hence, enhance financial performance 
of organizations.  
 Agency theory also implies as shareholder as principal and manager as 
agent, they do not take interest to share general purposes of companies with each 
other (JENSEN; MECKLING, 1976). This includes in conflict of interest which extent 
a huge problem to shareholders as the managers have right to use the internal 
information of company which makes them to track and use for their own benefits 
and interest.  
 These agent-principal conflicts of interest direct to formation of corporate 
governance regulations which integrate the task of board of directors as they perform 
the controlling, supervisory and counseling roles for decision making by top 
management which support the shareholder benefits that improve the efficiency of 
organization particularly banks because failure of the board of director has higher 
negative consequence to banks which direct to financial disorder and crises 
(CLAESSENS; YURTOGLU, 2013).  
 Conversely, several theoretical arguments enlightened the greater benefits 
will be achieved while women contribution in board, thus gender diversity also focus 
on societal pressure and certain quota sets by government regulations, thus forcing 
by government to fulfill certain quota and societal pressure, companies to induct 
incapable and incompetent women director hiring for their board that effects the 
efficiency of companies (BANTEL; JACKSON, 1989).  
 Agency theory is used to explain a positive effect of gender diversity of board 
for organizations performance. As per the perspective of agency theory, board 
gender diversity is essential system of corporate governance for organizations 
(GALLEGO-ÁLVAREZ et al., 2010).  
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  Hence, board gender diversity can be system that helps to reduce the cost 
associated with agency problems (REGUERA-ALVARADO et al., 2017a). Previous 
literature indicates that powerful corporate governance can decrease agency 
problems, thus enhances the financial performance and improve board controlling 
and monitoring (CARTER et al., 2003).  
 One of the research investigation suggests that the composition of board 
influence the results of organizations, hence the outcomes are mixed in terms of 
influence of female (TERJESEN et al., 2009b) and independent (DALTON et al., 
1998) directors.  
 Research has futile to investigate board independence formation in a gender 
diversity structure despite of taking interest by academics, policymakers and 
practitioners. Researchers have call for more exploration of relationship of board 
gender diversity outcome(ADAMS et al., 2015).  
 Literature entails various reasons for taking women as a board member of firm 
which increase variety of board members that could broaden team of experience, 
professional and expert for the boardroom to complete its tasks for shareholders 
favors (BURGESS; THARENOU, 2002). Another study described that female board 
member are more expected to actively participate in board activities as compare to 
the male counterpart (VIRTANEN, 2012) and also display collaboration and 
leadership skills (EAGLY; JOHNSON, 1990).  
 As per Daily et al. (1999) almost 60% women  involve in purchases in the US, 
as this is the essential part of any business and it shows that females are responsive 
and active observer of the market conditions and can bring a more positive approach 
as they thoroughly understand the customers requirement. 
 First study conducted on gender diversity in  Pakistan, (YASSER, 2012) 
explained the facts from 2008 to 2010 of all companies on KSE index 100 that only 
25% organizations consisted of at least one woman in board and the percentage of 
woman CEO was found 33.3%. The most important argument in support of 
management diversity is that more alternatives of decisions come up with more 
diversified board of directors.   
 Corporate governance is mainly concerned with the progress of systems and 
carries out the responsibility of corporate management and Increase Company’s 
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 efficiency (BRAMMER et al., 2007). Board gender composition has generally 
concern on two elements: economical and ethical concerns. According to 
economical perspective that the preference is best possible way rather than 
depraved. Conversely, as per the ethical aspect, an inadequate representation of 
women in board could be considered as bias. This viewpoint claims that it is immoral 
to eliminate woman director from the top echelons organization only because of 
gender (BRAMMER et al., 2007).    
 The upper echelons theory is familiar with more diversified senior 
management teams, thus more resourceful ideas generated with connected to 
improved advancement in organizations (JACKSON, 1992). Further researcher 
explained that more women particular on top positions are appointed, thus it 
increases the external pool of talent for board members. 
 Zahra and Stanton (1988) observed the association between gender diversity 
and financial competence of firms, they studied on 100 fortune 500 companies and 
applied ROE return on equity, EPS earning per share, profit, sale profit margin, 
dividend per share as performance constructs and found insignificant relationship 
between both financial competence of firms and gender diversity. In contract, 
(DARMIDI, 2010) found that existence of women on top position is negative effect on 
firms performance.   
In addition, one of the researches explore that the ratio of women on senior 
executive position is positively effect on firms performance, even after manipulative 
for several qualities, this affect depends on the talent of women on senior position 
(SMITH et al., 2006). 
2.3. Theoretical Framework 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical Framework 
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 In light of above literature review, we came up with the following constructs, 
one independent variable that is women on board number is taken as dummy 
variable, value is 1 if a woman is there in board in banking sector, otherwise 0 if 
there is no woman on board. The dependent variable consists of two constructs that 
are return on assets ROA and return on equity ROE that shows the bank efficiency 
with reference to financial performance. We have taken current assets, earning per 
share and board size as control variables to measure the bank performance.    
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Sample Size and Data Collection 
 The sample of this research comprises of 10 listed bank of Pakistan. 
Secondary data has been collected of 12 years from 2005 to 2016. The data of 
return on assets, return on equity, current assets, earning per share, board size and 
number of women on board are collected from annual reports and financial 
statements of banks available on their websites. This sector was selected because 
most of the women are in favor to join banks for constant time as compare to other 
sector and most of the market share belongs to these banks. 
3.2. Bank Performance 
 There are several financial performance indicators such as return on 
investment, Tobin’s Q, return on equity, return on assets and return on sales. These 
are classified into two types market based performance and financial performance. 
In this research paper we are using ROA and ROE as dependent variables. These 
two performance ratios are used to show the capability of accounting based income 
and return to shareholders (SHRADER et al., 1997). 
 The return on assets indicates that ability and power of the managers to use 
the assets of company which related to shareholders.  The management of the 
company is inefficient if the rate of ROA is lower. ROA is broadly used to measure 
the efficiency of companies in previous studies of gender diversity.  
 As per agency theory, management is used to mistreat earning and misused 
profits, resulting left with fewer returns for shareholders (UJUNWA et al., 2012). The 
second financial performance is ROE which is also generally use to measure firms 
performance, shows return on shareholder investments (ERHARDT et al., 2003).  
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 3.3. Board gender diversity 
 Woman director represents the independent variable, we have taken women 
on board number to measure board gender diversity. For women on board number, 
the total number of women that were present in that year in their respective bank are 
taken.  
 Three other independent variables have been taken in this study i.e. current 
assets, earning per share and board size and their impact on bank’s financial 
performance is analyzed. One of the study argue that corporate governance 
research discovered that there is a opposing relationship between board size and 
companies performance (HERMALIN; WEISBACH, 2001), however there is a 
affirmative relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q which is market based 
performance (YERMACK, 1996).  
3.4. Model Specification 
Model A 
LNTROAit = α0 + β1 LNTCRit + β2 TEPSit + β3 BSIZEit + β4 TWOBNit + еit 
Model B 
LNTROEit = α0 + β1 LNTCRit + β2 TEPSit + β3 BSIZEit + β4 TWOBNit + еit 
Table 1: Definition of Variables 
Variable  Definition 
LNTROA TROA ratio is calculated by dividing net income by average total assets. Then taken natural logarithm of ROA 
LNTROE TROE ratio is calculated by dividing net income by shareholders equity. Then taken natural logarithm of ROE 
LNTCR TCR is calculated by dividing current assets by current liabilities. Then taken natural log of CR 
EPS EPS is calculated by dividing profit by common outstanding share of bank 
BSIZE Number of board of directors in banks 
WOBN Number of women director on board of banks 
α Intercept Coefficient  
β Coefficient of Slope 
е Error Term  
4. ANALYSIS 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 The summary of descriptive statistics of the used variable is displayed in table 
2: 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Current Ratio 4.07 4.29 4.19 0.09 -0.09 -1.82 
Earnings per share 6.98 11.17 8.37 1.49 1.22 0.09 
Board Size 8.4 9.1 8.75 0.24 -0.23 -1.07 
Women on Board 
number 0 2 1.08 0.79 -0.16 -1.26 
Natural Log of 
Return on Asset 0 0.69 0.31 0.18 0.58 0.64 
Natural Log of 
Return on Equity 
2.28 3.34 2.83 .29 .10 .15 
 The table 2 presents a summary of the descriptive statistics of the study. The 
average ROA and ROE are 0.31and 2.83 respectively. Out of the 10 banks taken for 
the study, 30% have one or more women directors on their boards.  
 The number of woman director in banks is low as mean value is 1.08 ranging 
from 0.00 to 2.00 as compare to many European countries such as, Spain, Greece, 
Switzerland, Belgium (“GMI (Governance Metrics International) (2013), “GMI ratings’ 
2013 women on boards survey”, available at: 
http://www.communitybusiness.org/library/other_publication/gmiratings_wob_032012
.pd f (accessed 15 August 2014). - Google Scholar,” n.d.).   
 The results indicate that the mean value of the number of directors for the 
banking industry BSIZE is 8.75 from minimum 8.4 to a maximum 9.1. The average of 
current ratio is 4.19 ranging from 4.07 to 4.29. The results shows that the mean 
value of earning per share is 8.37 from minimum 6.98 to a maximum 11.17. 
4.2. Simple Linear Regression Model 
 Simple linear regression model is used to check the regression of the linear 
equation and also analyze the performance of the given variables in the model. 
Eviews 5 is applied to run the regression between ROA, ROE with WOBN, CR, EPS 
and BSIZE to analyze their association and examine the presence of women on 
board improve the banks performance of Pakistan.  
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 Table 3: Regression Analysis – Model A 
Dependent Variable: LNROA   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 09/03/17   Time: 16:06   
Sample: 2005 2016   
Included observations: 12   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -7.571631 4.294729 -1.763005 0.1213 
LNCR 2.188822 1.138319 1.922855 0.0959 
EPS 0.119738 0.089033 1.344877 0.2206 
BSIZE -0.261957 0.364008 -0.719646 0.4951 
WOBN 0.013624 0.081552 0.167063 0.8720 
     
     
R-squared 0.358039     Mean dependent var 0.313333 
Adjusted R-squared -0.008796     S.D. dependent var 0.184457 
S.E. of regression 0.185266     Akaike info criterion -0.239711 
Sum squared resid 0.240265     Schwarz criterion -0.037666 
Log likelihood 6.438264     F-statistic 0.976022 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.778275     Prob(F-statistic) 0.477604 
 Table 3 indicates that only board size is inversely related to return on assets, 
other than that all are positively related to return on assets as when a women enter 
in board, bank performance increases with return on assets. Earnings per share, 
board size and women on board are statistically insignificant, therefore we do not 
reject Hₒ. Only current assets are significant. 
 The C is intercept with a value of -7.57, as this is the initial point of return on 
equity, keeping other variables constant.R2 Value is 0.35%, F statistics is low i.e. 
0.97% which is less than 2 and probability is 0.47% which is > 0.05. This indicates 
the overall insignificance of the model.  
Table 4: Regression Analysis – Model B 
Dependent Variable: LNROE   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 09/03/17   Time: 16:14   
Sample: 2005 2016   
Included observations: 12   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -10.53493 6.095882 -1.728205 0.1276 
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 LNCR 4.162195 1.615715 2.576071 0.0367 
EPS 0.273835 0.126372 2.166892 0.0669 
BSIZE -0.728338 0.516668 -1.409682 0.2015 
WOBN 0.025237 0.115754 0.218020 0.8336 
     
     
R-squared 0.492502     Mean dependent var 2.830000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.202504     S.D. dependent var 0.294464 
S.E. of regression 0.262964     Akaike info criterion 0.460739 
Sum squared resid 0.484051     Schwarz criterion 0.662784 
Log likelihood 2.235565     F-statistic 1.698292 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.656929     Prob(F-statistic) 0.253622 
 Table 4 shows that the board size is inversely related to return on equity, 
however, current ratio and earning per share and women on board are positively 
related to return on equity as when a woman enter in board performance of bank 
increases with return on equity. Board size and women on board are statistically 
insignificant, conversely EPS and Current ratio are significant, therefore we reject Hₒ.  
 The C is intercept with a value of -10.53, as this is the initial point of return on 
equity, keeping other variables constant. R2 Value is 0.49%, F statistics value is low 
i.e. 1.69% which is less than 2 and probability is 0.25% which is > 0.05. This 
indicates the overall insignificance of the model. 
4.3. Correlation 
Following table shows the relationships though correlation 
Table 5: Correlation Analysis 
  BSIZE LNCR EPS LNROA LNROE WOBN 
BSIZE 1.00           
LNCR -0.13 1.00         
EPS 0.60 -0.73 1.00       
LNROA 0.10 0.40 -0.02 1.00     
LNROE 0.06 0.32 0.09 0.91 1.00   
WOBN -0.17 0.32 -0.47 -0.001 -0.08 1.00 
 Table 5 shows the Current ratio and Board size, Women on board number 
and Board size, Earning Per share (EPS) and Current Ratio, Return on Assets 
(ROA) and Earning per share (EPS), Women on board number and earning per 
share (EPS), Women on board number and return on Assets (ROA), Women on 
board number and Return on Equity (ROE) are inversely correlated to each other.  
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  Earnings per share (EPS) and Board size, Return on Assets (ROA) and Board 
size, Return on Equity (ROE) and Board size, Return on Asset and Current Ratio, 
Return on Equity (ROE) and Current Ratio, Women on Board number and Current 
Ratio, Return on equity (ROE) and Earning Per share (EPS), Return on Equity 
(ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA) are positively correlated.  
 Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA) have the strongest 
correlation (r=0.91) followed by Earning per share (EPS) and Board Size (r=0.6). The 
weakest correlation is between Women on board number and Return on Asset 
(ROA) (r=0.001). 
4.4. Heteroscedasticity 
 Heteroscedasticity is when the variance of the error term is not constant. 
When the data suffers from heteroscedasticity, the OLS estimators become less 
efficient thus leading to lesser reliability of the statistical results. 
4.4.1. Graphical Method 
 The Error term is represented by ERR and is the Residual term in the data. 
The ERRSQ is also taken by taking square of the term ERR. Then we see graph to 
detect heteroscedasticity. We can plot histogram for ERSQ. 
Figure 2: Histogram of Error term Figure 3: Histogram of Square of Error term 
 The variance of ERRSQ is different for different observations. The variations 
in the histogram shows heteroscedasticity.  
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 4.4.2. Breush Pagan Test 
 Now we took ERRSQ as dependent variable and ran the regression with 
independent and control variables to check the results.  
Table 6: Breush Pagan Test 
Dependent Variable: ERRSQ   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 09/03/17   Time: 17:38   
Sample: 2005 2016   
Included observations: 12   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.503422 1.154522 -0.436044 0.6759 
LNCR 0.163739 0.306006 0.535082 0.6092 
EPS -0.005106 0.023934 -0.213338 0.8371 
BSIZE -0.008430 0.097854 -0.086148 0.9338 
WOBN -0.023068 0.021923 -1.052231 0.3277 
     
     
R-squared 0.231211     Mean dependent var 0.040338 
Adjusted R-squared -0.208097     S.D. dependent var 0.045312 
S.E. of regression 0.049804     Akaike info criterion -2.867114 
Sum squared resid 0.017363     Schwarz criterion -2.665070 
Log likelihood 22.20269     F-statistic 0.526307 
Durbin-Watson stat 3.167333     Prob(F-statistic) 0.720810 
     
 Table 6 indicates that the value of F stats is 52.6 and probability is 72.1 % 
which is more than 10%, therefore, we do not reject Ho and say that there is no 
heteroscedasticity present. 
4.4.3.  White Test 
 The outcomes of the white test are as below: 
Table 7: White Heteroscedasticity Test  
     
     F-statistic 0.120940     Probability 0.992194 
Obs*R-squared 2.926314     Probability 0.938896 
     
     
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 09/03/17   Time: 17:46   
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 Sample: 2005 2016   
Included observations: 12   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -59.13176 143.4513 -0.412208 0.7079 
LNCR 31.64362 89.25311 0.354538 0.7464 
LNCR^2 -3.737031 10.47711 -0.356685 0.7449 
EPS 0.178835 0.759663 0.235413 0.8290 
EPS^2 -0.008876 0.037018 -0.239769 0.8260 
BSIZE -1.973011 15.69757 -0.125689 0.9079 
BSIZE^2 0.112578 0.890224 0.126461 0.9074 
WOBN -0.044819 0.265815 -0.168609 0.8768 
WOBN^2 0.017664 0.127895 0.138110 0.8989 
     
     
R-squared 0.243860     Mean dependent var 0.020022 
Adjusted R-squared -1.772515     S.D. dependent var 0.028575 
S.E. of regression 0.047580     Akaike info criterion -3.139116 
Sum squared resid 0.006791     Schwarz criterion -2.775436 
Log likelihood 27.83469     F-statistic 0.120940 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.950611     Prob(F-statistic) 0.992194 
     
      Probability is more than 10 % that is 99.2 %. So we do not reject Ho and say 
there is no heteroscedasticity exists. 
4.5. Multicollinearity 
 We have to run auxiliary regression and make LNCR (Current ratio) as 
dependent and EPS, BSIZE and WOBN as independent variable to check its 
multicollinearity. 
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 Table 8: Multicollinearity 
 
 
 Table 8 indicates that R² is 68% and f-stat is 5 and Probability is 2% so we 
reject Ho (there is no multicollinearity). We conclude that there is no multicollinearity 
exists between Current ratio and Earning per share, board size, women on board 
number. 
4.6. Data Stationary or Non Stationary 
4.6.1. Augmented Dickey Fuller Test - Model A with ROA 
 To check the stationary of data ADF Augmented Dickey Fuller test is applied 
on Model A with ROA. 
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 Table 9: Augmented Dickey Fuller Test for ROA 
 
 At level: Ho is rejected as Probability is 3.6 which is less than 10%, so data is 
stationary at level. 
Condition of ADF Test 
If the t stats > t-Critical =Reject Ho  
If the t stats < t-Critical =Accept Ho 
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 Table 10: Augmented Dickey Fuller Test for ROA 
 
 
At 1st difference: Probability is 14.3 % which is more than 10 % we accept null 
hypothesis and say data is non-stationary. 
4.6.2. Augmented Dickey Fuller Test - Model B with ROE 
 Following table is for Augmented Dickey fuller for the model B with Dependent 
variable as ROE. 
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 Table 11: Augmented Dickey Fuller Test for ROE 
 
 At level: Ho is rejected as Probability is 5.7 which is less than 10%, so data is 
stationary at level. 
5. DISCUSSION 
 Board of directors plays an essential role in governance systems that support 
to line up the benefits of shareholders and managers (REGUERA-ALVARADO et al., 
2015). The board composition may affect the success of decision making of board 
which resultant the effect on bank financial performance. One of the most essential 
uniqueness of board is gender as we know that the percentage of woman director 
has been rising on a regular interval. As the women director increases, there is a 
negative effect of gender diversity on bank financial performance as this research 
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 also examines the relationship between board gender diversity and bank financial 
performance. The results does not support the hypotheses of this research H1, H2 
and H3.  
 The findings of this study does not support the hypothesis that woman director 
has negative insignificant effect on bank financial performance, thus gender diversity 
in the board has a negative association with bank performance which is calculated 
by financial indicators of ROA and ROE.  Conversely various reasons are in favor to 
induct woman director to their board, as gender diversity has a positive effect on 
economic growth as per the previous studies. Corporate governance mechanism is 
also improved by board gender diversity (CARTER et al., 2003) and women produce 
better communication and good relation with other women customers (ROSE, 2007) 
and also enhance the efficiency of decision making by coming up with several 
different views and approaches in board (CARTER et al., 2003). 
 Moreover, as per theoretical point of view, the results of this research study 
are not reliable with both theories that is agency and resource dependency theory in 
which board gender diversity negatively effect on bank financial performance. It 
concludes that the women directors are not likely to enhance the performance of 
banks. In contrast of this, a study conducted in banking sector of Pakistan that 
shows significant positive relationship between board gender diversity and bank 
performance and has negative correlation with the presence of woman CEO in 
banks (SHAFIQUE et al., 2014). There is another study which also indicates that 
there is affirmative relation between board gender diversity and bank performance 
(YASSER, 2012). 
6. CONCLUSION 
 It concludes, gender diversity brings the insignificant impact on economic 
value of Pakistan as induction of woman director cannot improve the financial 
performance of banks. This study brings attention and also attracted to the 
regulatory bodies, government companies, policy makers, shareholders to have 
gender composition of board of directors.  
 There are several studies indicate to have woman director is positively effect 
on the performance of organization but other argue have examined the negative 
results. The results of this study shown that man dominance remain on the board of 
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 the Pakistan banks. Moreover the findings signify that gender diversity on board has 
insignificant relationship with banks financial performance as calculated through 
ROA and ROE. 
 There are several discussion and researches in previous studies regarding 
the effect of gender board diversity on firm efficiency, from a purely economic 
perception this research suggests that firms should proliferation women 
representation on their boards of banks.  
 There are other factors of gender diversity on which company policies needs 
to integrate that are social and ethical reasons, gender diversity should not only 
based on economic purposes (REGUERA-ALVARADO et al., 2017b). It is 
discriminatory and unethical to eliminate woman from corporate boards only on the 
base of gender. Board gender diversity is required and shows a positive indication to 
the people regarding its ethical and social behaviors (TERJESEN et al., 2016).  
7. LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 There are various limitations of this research found. First, there are several 
elements that effect on bank financial performance and this research could not take 
all of them to measure the financial performance in regard to presence of women on 
board. Hence, future studies should consist other indicators of liquidity and 
profitability ratios of financial performance as in this study we have taken only two 
that are ROA and ROE.  
 Secondly gender is only one characteristics of board diversity. Therefore 
future research need to check other aspects of board diversity such has education, 
experience, culture and age on bank performance. This study is purely based on 
quantitative research as we have collected secondary data from annual reports of 
banks.  
 Further studies needs to be conducted with large sample of banks and 
different methodologies such as surveys, case studies and qualitative research to 
find out the causes of the issue that why the number of women on board decreasing 
with ROA and ROE. Thus this study recommends to re-assess the association 
between gender diversity and bank performance after the regulation concerning the 
gender quotas has been executed by code of corporate governance of Pakistan.  
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ANNEXURE 1: DATA FOR EVIEWS AND SPSS 
Years  LNCR EPS BSIZE WOBN LNROA LNROE 
2005  4.28 6.98 8.40 1.00 0.47 3.34 
2006  4.26 7.86 8.90 1.00 0.69 3.24 
2007  4.29 7.91 8.70 1.00 0.55 3.10 
2008  4.29 7.26 8.80 2.00 0.26 2.68 
2009  4.24 7.21 9.00 2.00 0.17 2.58 
2010  4.10 7.86 8.40 2.00 0.19 2.60 
2011  4.12 8.17 8.60 2.00 0.33 2.79 
2012  4.21 7.95 8.80 1.00 0.25 2.78 
2013  4.18 7.13 8.50 0.00 0.00 2.28 
2014  4.07 9.89 8.80 0.00 0.32 2.83 
2015  4.07 11.17 9.10 0.00 0.32 2.92 
2016  4.11 11.04 9.00 1.00 0.21 2.82 
 
 
 
